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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon the Court's
granting of the plaintiff Mounteer's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to review the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals,
Percy Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co,. 107 Utah Adv. Rpt.
71, 773 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1989).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Defendant UP&L is dissatisfied with the Mounteer's
statement

of the

issues presented

for review.

As the

Complaint was dismissed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the
issue

for

review

necessarily

allegations and inferences.

arises

from

its

factual

The Complaint alleges that one

employee, Nicki Larsen, intentionally defamed a co-employee,
Percy Mounteer, and intentionally caused Mounteer emotional
distress.
not

UP&L employed both Larsen and Mounteer.

intend,

direct,

participate

intentional tortious conduct.

nor

ratify

UP&L did
Larsen1s

In fact, this intentional

tortious conduct violated UP&L policies.

Mounteer sustained

injury to his psychological, mental and emotional well-being;
suffered

post-traumatic

depression,

all

of

which

stress

disorder,

required

anguish

psychiatric

and

hospital

treatment; and permanently and totally disabled him from
employment.

1

Thus, under the alleged facts, the issue is: Has Mounteer
stated a cause of action for damages against his employer for
these injuries?
Like that of the trial court, the standard for this
Court's review is, construing the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and

indulging all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff
would be entitled to relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claim.

Burnett v. Utah

Power & Light Co., No. 880369, filed September 4, 1990, and
cases cited therein. Indulging reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff applies only to the facts and not to the
conclusions of law.

See Kohen v. H.S. Crocker Co., 260 F2d

790 (5th Cir. 1958).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The interpretation of §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988) is
determinative of the issue on appeal:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by
an employee, whether resulting in death or not,
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer
and shall be the exclusive remedy

against any

officer, agent or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act
shall be in place of any and all other civil
2

liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise,
to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children,
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
representatives, guardian, or any

other person

whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated
or incurred by such employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of his employment, and no
action at law may be maintained against an employer
or against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury or death
of an employee.

Nothing in this section, however,

shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from
filing a claim with the industrial commission of
Utah for compensation in those cases within the
provisions

of

the

Utah

Occupational

Disease

Disability Act, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
UP&L is dissatisfied with the Plaintiff's statement of
the case.

UP&L's statement is as follows:

On October 6, 1986, Mounteer was an employee of UP&L as
was Larsen.

Mounteer, while on the job, and at the hands of

Larsen who was also on the job, suffered mental and emotional
trauma at that time, as well as an aggravation of a jobrelated mental trauma suffered two years earlier. Mounteerfs
3

Complaint alleged causes of action for defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

UP&L's Motion to Dismiss, U.R.C.P.

12(b)(6), was granted without prejudice on August 17, 1987.
Record at Pages 10 & 107. (Hereinafter the Record will be
cited as R.
While

) .
the Motion

to

Dismiss was under

Mounteer sought to file an Amended Complaint.

advisement,
R. 41 & 103.

Following the entry of the Judgment of Dismissal, the trial
court, sua sponte, struck as moot the Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend the Complaint.
Mounteer presented to the trial court all of the probable
state of facts in support of his claim.

The fatal defects in

Mounteer's pleadings, as identified by the trial court, were
incorporated
Plaintiff's

into

the

Objections,

Order
R.

of

Dismissal.

123; Order

Order Upon

and

Judgment

of

and

Judgment

of

Dismissal, R. 125.
The
Dismissal

Plaintiff

appealed

the

Order

to the Utah Supreme Court which transferred the

appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals

issued its opinion affirming the trial court's dismissal in
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71, 77 3
P.2d 405 (Utah App.1989). (Hereinafter Mounteer).

A copy of

the Court of Appeals opinion is attached hereto as Appendix
A.

4

Mounteer then filed with this Court a Petition for Writ
of Certiorari claiming that the injuries suffered by Mounteer
were not compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
and, therefore, not barred from a civil suit against the
employer by §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988).

The Petition for

Writ of Certiorari was granted by this Court on June 5, 1990.
The following are the facts alleged in the Complaint:
1.

At all times relevent to the Mounteer's claim,

Mounteer and Larsen were employees of UP&L and were acting in
the course and scope of their employment. Complaint fj 3, 4,
5 & 7; R. 2, 3 & 4.
2.

UP&L instructed Larsen to "investigate" Mounteer for

drug use according to UP&L's specific policies for such an
investigation.
3.

Larsen's conduct which injured Mounteer violated

those policies.
4.

Complaint ffl 7 & 16, R. 4 & 5.

Complaint ff 7 & 16, R. 4 & 5.

Larsen's conduct was intentional, grossly negligent,

malicious, outrageous and reckless. Complaint ff 17, 19 & 21,
R. 5 & 6.
5.
inferred

Mounteer makes no allegation from which it can be
that

UP&L

intended,

directed,

participated

or

ratified Larsen's intentional tortious acts.
6.

Mounteer has conceded that under no state of the

alleged facts can it be proven that UP&L intended, directed,
participated or ratified Larsen's intentional tortious acts.

5

Transcript of July 31, 1987, Hearing Upon Motion to Dismiss,
Page 15, Line 9-16 & 23-24 R. 164; Page 16, Line 10-12, R.
165; Page 18, Line 13-20, R. 167.
7.

As

the

result

of

Larsen's

intentional

torts,

Mounteer suffered severe mental and emotional damage requiring
psychiatric

hospital

treatment.

Additionally, he suffered

Complaint

f

10.

severe aggravation of a post-

traumatic stress disorder, permanently and totally disabling
him from employment.

Complaint 5 11.

Mounteer sought

recovery of the substantial medical costs and expenses which
he incurred and expected to incur.
8.

Complaint 5 12 & 18.

Only in the prayer for relief does Mounteer request

damages for embarrassment and damage to his reputation.
Complaint Prayer for Relief f 2.

In Paragraph 1 to the

Prayer, the Plaintiff requests "for judgment for slander, in
the amount of $500,000, or such other sum as may be proved,
for permanent, total disability due to post-traumatic stress
disorder."

Complaint Prayer for Relief 5 1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As he did before the trial court and before the Court of
Appeals, Mounteer again ignores the "key fact that he was
Larsen's fellow employee when he was allegedly injured in the
course of his employment by Larsen's performance of her
assigned task and refuses to acknowledge that the workers'
compensation statute has reshaped an employer's liability in
6

such circumstances." Mounteer at 407. Mounteer's claim must
be analyzed in light of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act
which

defines

the

employee's

rights

and

the

employer's

obligations in cases of injuries suffered on the job.

When

so analyzed, it is apparent that Mounteer does not state a
cause of action against UP&L.

UP&L did not act, or fail to

act, in any manner which lifts the bar to civil suit in §351-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988) . UP&L did not act, or fail to act,
in any manner which makes UP&L liable for Larsen's intentional
torts under the doctrine of respondeat superior, regardless
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
event was an accident.

The injury-causing

Finally, the entirety of Mounteer's

injuries are compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

MOUNTEER ALLEGES NO ACTIONABLE CONDUCT OR OMISSION BY

UP&L
Mounteer acknowledges an absence of any fact or inference
that UP&L caused or contributed to the injury-causing event
of October 6, 1986, or to his injuries. The sole basis of his
claim against UP&L is that UP&L employed Larsen.

Were the

analysis to stop there, the Complaint would withstand a Motion
to Dismiss.

However, when one adds the additional fact that

Mounteer also was employed by UP&L and the injury occurred
while both Mounteer and Larsen were on the job, then UP&L's
only connection to the injury-causing event or the injury
7

itself

is

as

an

employer.

UP&L's

obligation

is thus

exclusively governed by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and
Mounteer's civil suit is barred.

§35-1-60 Utah Code Ann.

(1988).
If the employment relationship is the only connection
between the employer to an employee's injury, then workers1
compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer.
In Brvan v. Utah Intern'tl, 533 P. 2d 892 (Utah 1975), this
Court held that while an employee is not protected by the
exclusivity provision of workers' compensation from a separate
action at law for damages resulting from the intentional
injury of a co-employee, the employer must be shown to have
some connection to the injury other than merely the status of
employer, i.e. to have directed or intended the injurious act
or the injury, before the employee may also sue the employer.
In Mounteer, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled upon this
issue by stating:
According to Mounteer's own allegations, he was
indisputably injured by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment. He was thus clearly barred by
the statute from bringing a negligence action at law
against either Larsen or UP&L.
His allegations
concerning Larsen's intentional conduct, however, were
sufficient to state a direct tort claim against her that
was not barred by the exclusivity provision in Section
35-1-60, but she was not made a defendant, and UP&L
cannot be liable at law for Larsen's intentional acts
merely by operation of vicarious liability. Mounteer,
at 407-408.

8

Even if Mounteer was not UP&L's employee, he must allege
facts which would establish that UP&L itself acted or failed
to act in a manner which caused his injury since without such
facts UP&L is not liable for the intentional torts of its
employee Larsen.
In fact, Mounteer portrays UP&L as purely passive to
Larsen's intentional torts. He does not and indeed cannot in
good faith allege that UP&L itself spoke, hired Larsen to
speak, or ratified her speech.

Mounteer acknowledges that

Larsen acted contrary to UP&L's direction and intent as
embodied in UP&L's policies.

Complaint f 7, R. 4.

UP&L is

not, as a matter of law, liable for Larsen's defamatory words.
Therefore, under no state of facts as could be proven in
support of Mounteer's claim, did he state a cause of action
against UP&L and the Complaint was properly dismissed.
II.

FROM UP&L'S PERSPECTIVE, THE DECEMBER 1984 WILBERG MINE

FIRE AND THE EVENT

OCTOBER 6, 1986, WERE ACCIDENTS.

Mounteer devotes much of his brief to the argument that
defamation is not an accident within the meaning of §35-1-60
Utah Code Ann. (1988) . But the facts alleged compel a finding
that, as to UP&L, whose point of view is the reference point
from which this judgment is made, the Wilberg Mine fire and
Larsen's acts on October 6, 1986, and the injuries which
befell Mounteer were accidental.

9

The Utah Court of Appeals cited as controlling the
definition of "accident" in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n.. 729
P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986) which held that an accident is an
unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the
cause of an injury or the result of an injury,
408, ft. note 3.

Mounteer at

Thus, an intentional act resulting in an

unintentional and unforeseeable injury is an accident.
Allen further defines accident as a causal connection
between the injury and injured worker's employment duties.
Id. at 22. Such a connection is found throughout
Complaint.

Mounteer1 s

Mounteer attributes his fragile mental state to

the Wilberg Mine fire of December 1984 and he further claims
his complete mental destruction by Larsen's acts of October
6, 1986.

He directly relates

his injury to his employment

duties by claiming a permanent and total disability from
employment.

In fact, except for an ambiguous reference to

reputational

injury

in the Prayer

for Relief/ Mounteer

describes the injury-causing event, the injury itself, and the
results of the injury to be as severe an employment related
personal injury as the loss of a limb, being rendered blind
or disfigured from a defective piece of machinery. All of the
events described in the Complaint are, to UP&L, the

1

A mere naked prayer unsupported by affirmative allegations
cannot aid a defective pleading. In re Somers' Estate, 187
P.2d 433, 435 (Cal App 1947). A prayer for relief forms no
part of the cause of action. Campbell v. Benson, 637 P. 2d
578, 582 (N.M. 1981).
10

unexpected or unintended cause of injury or result of injury
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred in the course
of, or because of, or arising out of Mounteer's employment.
Further, it does not matter that the cause of the injury
was the intentional tortious act of Mounteer's co-worker. As
this Court has recognized in Bryan v. Utah Internftl. 533 P.2d
892

(Utah

1975) , the reality

of the workplace

is that

employees do not always conduct themselves as the employer
wishes or in accord with the employer's policies.
employees

may

deviate

from

their

duties

At times,

and

intentional injurious conduct of many forms.

engage

in

Unless the

employer intended or directed this deviation, to the employer
the injury caused by the intentional conduct is "one more
industrial mishap in the factory," for which the employer is
not liable.

Larson, Workmens' Compensation Law. §68.21 at

13-74.
Accordingly, under any state of facts which Mounteer
could prove in support of his claim, the cause of his injuries
and the results of his injuries were as to UP&L an accident.
His claim is barred and the Motion to Dismiss was properly
granted.
III. MOUNTEER'S CLAIM IS FOR INJURIES WHICH ARE COMPENSABLE
UNDER THE UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT.
In

the

Complaint,

Mounteer

describes

his

injuries

exclusively as injuries which are compensable under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.

Mounteer's involvement in the
11

Wilberg Mine fire set a stage of mental stress which Larsen's
intentional tortious acts aggravated to a state of disabling
mental and emotional injury, requiring hospitalization.

He

incurred extensive medical costs and anticipates substantial
future medical costs,
Mounteer described his injuries in his Complaint, before
the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals, as personal
injuries consisting of mental trauma, distress and emotional
disorders.

All of Mounteer's allegations

emphasize the

physical and mental character of the injuries, relating them
to a series of specific, stressful, work-related incidents.
The root cause of Mounteer's injuries was his involvement in
the Wilberg Mine disaster of December 1984.
October

6,

1986,

was

an

aggravating

The incident of

continuum

of

that

stressful event. Construing the allegations in the light most
favorable to Mounteer and indulging all reasonable inferences
in his favor, one may conclude only that the injuries of which
Mounteer complains are compensable under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
Mounteer's Brief cites a series of cases which hold that
to

determine

whether

a

civil

action

is barred

by

the

exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation law requires
an injury-oriented analysis.
. . . the key to whether the Workmen's Compensation
Act precludes a common law right of action lies in
the nature of the injury for which plaintiff makes
claim, not the nature of the defendant's act which
plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that
injury. Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football
12

Club. 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. App. 1978); Accord,
Foley v. Polaroid Corp.. 413 N.E.2d 711 (Mass. Supr.
1980) ; Battista v. Chrysler Corp.. 454 A.2d 286
(Del. Super. 1982).
Thus, if the nature of the injury complained of is an
accidental, personal injury, it is compensable and an action
against the employer is precluded, regardless of the nature
of the act.

In this case, defamation is the act which is

alleged to have been responsible for the personal injury.
Damage to reputation is a proprietary rather than a
personal

injury

and

is

not

barred

by

the

exclusivity

provisions of workers' compensation laws. Battista, supra at
289.

Mounteer's claim is exclusively for personal injuries

which have a medical identity, physical and mental impact, and
are medically treated.
The trial court inquired if Mounteer had filed a workers1
compensation claim for such a claim would be decisive that the
Motion to Dismiss should be granted. Transcript of July 31,
1987 Hearing Upon Motion to Dismiss, Page 11, Line 11-14,
R. 160.

Such a claim was filed but was ultimately denied

because of his failure to cooperate.

Transcript Page 10-11,

R. 159-160.
Mounteer's pleadings and his oral argument before the
trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals describe his
injuries as injuries which are compensable under the Utah

13

Workers' Compensation Act.

Accordingly, his claim against

UP&L based solely upon UP&L's status as employer and not upon
any active participation or involvement in the accident, is
absolutely barred by §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988).

CONCLUSION
Mounteer has characterized his injury as personal and,
therefore, compensable under workers1 compensation

in his

Complaint and claim to the Industrial Commission. Before this
Court, he argues the injury was purely proprietary. It is the
Complaint which frames the cause of action scrutinized by the
courts below and which is before this Court.

Compensable

personal injury is the heart of Mounteer's claim as was
recognized by the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals.
Their decisions reflect an application of Utah law to the
facts as plead, not the facts as Mounteer would like them to
be.

Their decisions are also based upon the prohibition of

a double recovery one under workers' compensation, the second
in an action at law.

Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 423 N.W.2d at

716, ft. note 6.
Mounteer's claim for proprietary damages is, at best,
peripheral to his personal injury claim.

Even by indulging

all responsible inferences in Mounteer's favor does not save
his claim against UP&L.

As a purely passive party, related

to the injury-causing event and to the injury solely as the
employer, UP&L is entitled to a dismissal.
14

All attempts to

mold this case into something else distorts the integrity of
the exclusivity provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act.

The rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals

should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 7th day of December, 1990.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Paul H. Proctor
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that he discovered or should have discovered the alleged misconduct by September
1982, but his notice of intent to bring this
action was not filed until November 1985.
Therefore, we hold that his claim was
barred by the one year statute of limitations set forth in section 78-14-4(lXb). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for
defendants.
Finally, Floyd asserts that the special
statute of limitations contained in the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act violates the
equal protection clause of the United
States and Utah Constitutions. However,
Floyd failed to raise this issue in the trial
court proceedings or preserve it on the
record, and we decline to consider the issue
for the first time on appeal. James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah CtApp.
1987).
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

Percy MOUNTEER, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 880189-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 2, 1989.
Employee appealed from final order
and judgment of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J.,
dismissing without prejudice his complaint
against employer arising out of security
guard's alleged intentional broadcasting
over public-address system that employee
was using drugs. The Court of Appeals,
Jackson, J., held that: (1) exclusive remedy
provision of Workmen's Compensation Law

barred employee from bringing negligence
action against either security guard or employer, and (2) employer was not liable for
guard's intentional acts, absent allegation
that it directed or intended those acts.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error $=>919
In reviewing dismissal for failure to
state claim, appellate court must construe
complaint in light most favorable to plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff's favor.
2. Pretrial Procedure <s=»624
Dismissal for failure to state claim is
appropriate only where it appears to certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any state of facts which could
be proved in support of claims asserted.
3. Workers' Compensation e=»2168
Employee suffering compensable injury cannot maintain action at law against
fellow employee who was merely negligent
or an employer as vicariously liable principal; instead workers' compensation provides exclusive remedy to injured employee. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 35-1-60.
4. Workers' Compensation «=»2168
Employee who, in course of and scope
of his or her employment, intentionally acts
to injure co-worker is not protected by exclusive remedy provision of Workmen's
Compensation Law from separate action at
law for damages, but in such a case employer is liable only to extent of workers'
compensation benefits unless injurious act
was directed or intended by employer.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60.
5. Workers' Compensation e»514
For purposes of workers' compensation, "accident" is unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either cause or
result of injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
6. Master and Servant e=>306
Employer was not vicariously liable for
intentional, injurious acts of security
APPENDIX A

406

Utah

773 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

guards investigating employee's suspected
drug use, absent allegation that employer
intended or directed those acts, which were
allegedly in violation of company policy;
guard announced on open-page system connected to loudspeakers that employee was
on drugs and persisted in making those
allegations despite being advised that announcement was being broadcast on public
address system.

Robert B. Sykes, M. Gale Lemmon, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
Robert Gordon, Paul H. Proctor, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and respondent
Before BENCH, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION

sisted and continued to make allegations
to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs.
These false statements, which Mounteer
claimed were either intentionally, recklessly, or negligently made by Larsen, resulted
in severe mental and emotional damage
that, in turn, resulted in Mounteer's hospitalization and the aggravation of his posttraumatic stress disorder, rendering him
totally disabled from employment
Mounteer did not sue Larsen, and made
no allegations of any negligent or intentional injurious acts by UP & L directly.
Instead, he sought to hold UP & L vicariously liable in damages for the acts of its
agent, Larsen, under three asserted causes
of action. The first was for slander for the
unprivileged publication of false and defamatory statements, which, "in fact, was
in violation of the company's procedures
with respect to allegations of drug
use
" The second and third causes of
action were for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. He requested reimbursement for medical expenses, and damages for permanent total
disability, suffering, and damage to reputation.

JACKSON, Judge:
Percy Mounteer appeals from the final
order and judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a cause of action
against respondent Utah Power & Light
Company ("UP & L"). We affirm.
According to the June 1987 complaint
In the absence of any allegations that
filed in this action, Mounteer worked as a UP & L intended or directed Larsen's injuwarehouseman at UP & L's mine in Emery rious acts, which were allegedly in violation
County, Utah. He was under elevated of UP & L's policy, the trial court concludmental stress because of his involvement in ed UP & L could not be liable. Mounteer's
the December 1984 Wilburg mine disaster. complaint was dismissed without prejuNiki Larsen, a security guard for UP & L, dice.1
was instructed by her superiors at UP & L
to investigate Mounteer for suspected drug
[1,2] In reviewing a dismissal for failuse. UP & L had specific procedures to be ure to state a claim, this court must confollowed in such cases. On October 6, strue the complaint in the light most favor1986, Larsen came to the mine, briefly in- able to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonterviewed Mounteer at work, and
able inferences in plaintiffs favor. Arrow
in violation of company policy, and on an Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank 767 P.2d
open-page system that was connected to 935, 936 (Utah 1988). Such a dismissal is
loudspeakers, knowingly communicated appropriate only where it appears to a certo many of defendant's other employees tainty that the plaintiff would not be entithat [Mounteer] was on drugs. When tled to relief under any state of facts which
advised by another of defendant's em- could be proved in support of the claims
ployees that it was being broadcast on asserted. Freegard v. First W. Nat'l
the public-address system, Larsen per- Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987).
1. Because this ruling resolved the legal merits of
any cause Mounteer may frame against UP & L,
the order dismissing his complaint without prej-

udice is final for purposes of appeal. See
Bowles v. State ex rel Utah Dep't of Transp., 652
P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982).
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against any officer, agent, or employee
Appellant avers that his is a textbook
of the employer and the liabilities of the
case in which the employer should be vicaremployer imposed by this act shall be in
iously liable, under the principle of responplace
of any and all other civil liability
deat superior, for the negligent or intenwhatsoever,
at common law or otherwise,
tional acts of an employee/agent that into such employee ... or any other person
jure a third party while that employee is
whomsoever, on account of any accicarrying out the employer's business and
dent or injury or death, in any way
acting within the scope of employment
See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake County, contracted, sustained, aggravated or
771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989); Whitehead v. incurred by such employee in the
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 101 Utah course of or because of or arising out of
his employment, and no action at law
Adv.Rep. 24 (1989); see also Johnson v.
may
be maintained against an employer
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) (recognizor
against
any officer, agent, or employing cause of action for negligent infliction of
ee
of
the
employer
based upon any acciemotional distress and enunciating standent,
injury
or
death
of an employee
dards for employer's vicarious liability to
third party for punitive damages awarded (Emphasis added.) If an employee suffers
a compensable injury, defined in Utah Code
against negligent employee).
Ann. § 35-1-45 (1987) as one that occurs
We agree that, viewing Mounteer's alle- by accident arising out of or in the course
gations in a favorable light, as we must, of his employment,2 this section bars the
reasonable minds could conclude as a factu- maintenance of an action at law against
al matter that Larsen was acting within the either a fellow employee who is merely
scope of her employment under the criteria negligent or the employer as a vicariously
enunciated in Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057, liable principal. Instead, workers' compenwhen she made the allegedly defamatory sation provides the exclusive remedy to the
statements. However, the appropriate le- injured employee. E.g., Morrill v. J & M
gal analysis does not stop here. Mounteer Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981);
ignores the additional key fact that he was Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139,
Larsen's fellow employee when he was al- 442 P.2d 31 (1968); Masich, 191 P.2d at
legedly injured in the course of his employ- 616.
ment by Larsen's performance of her as[4] On the other hand, an employee
signed task and refuses to acknowledge who, in the course and scope of his or her
that the workers' compensation statute has employment, intentionally acts to injure a
reshaped an employer's liability in such co-worker is not protected by this exclusivicircumstances. See Masich v. United ty provision from a separate action at law
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., for damages. Bryan v. Utah InVl, 533
113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 615-17, appeal P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). But, in such a case,
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S.Ct 138, 93 the employer is liable only to the extent of
L.Ed. 411 (1948); see generally 1 A. Lar- workers' compensation benefits unless the
son, Workmen's Compensation Law injurious act was directed or intended by
\% 4.10-4.50 (19&5V
the employer. Id. at &35. Without such
direct responsibility, the employer "could
[3] Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988) not be required to respond as the offending
employee's superior." Stewart v. CMI
provides:
The right to recover compensation pur- Corp., 740 P.2d 1340,1341 n. 1 (Utah 1987)
suant to the provisions of this title for (dictum). See A. Larson, 2A Workmen's
injuries sustained by an employee, Compensation Law §§ 68.21, 68.23 & n.
whether resulting in death or not, shall 37, 68.33 & n. 49.1 (1987).
[5,6] According to Mounteer's own allebe the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy gations, he was indisputably injured by ac2. This phrase was recently changed to "by accident arising out of and in the course of employ-

mem." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) (emphasis added).
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cident3 arising out of or in the course of
his employment He was thus clearly
barred by the statute from bringing a negligence action at law against either Larsen
or UP & L His allegations concerning
Larsen's intentional conduct, however,
were sufficient to state a direct tort claim
against her that was not barred by the
exclusivity provision in section 35-1-60, but
she was not made a defendant, and UP & L
cannot be liable at law for Larsen's intentional acts merely by operation of vicarious
liability.4 If Mounteer had alleged facts
supporting an inference that UP & L directed or intended Larsen's injurious acts,
he would have sufficiently stated a claim
against UP & L directly, and the statute
would likewise afford UP & L no shield
from liability in damages. "A complaint, to
survive a motion to dismiss, must do more
than merely allege intentional injury as an
exception to the general exclusiveness rule;
it must allege facts that add up to a deliberate intent [by the employer] to bring
about injury." 2A A. Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 68.14 (1987). In the
absence of any such factual allegations,
however, the trial court correctly concluded
as a matter of law that Mounteer failed to
state a claim against UP & L
The order of the trial court dismissing
Mounteer's complaint is, therefore, affirmed.
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur.

James R. WESTON, Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent,
•.

Pat L. WESTON, Defendant, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant
No. 870561-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 4, 1989.
Husband commenced divorce proceeding. The First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., divided marital property, and appeals were taken. The
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that
(1) husband's stock in closely held family
corporations was properly valued, and (2)
husband could be ordered to make cash
payments to wife rather than in-kind distribution of stock.
Affirmed and remanded.
1. Divorce <s=>253(3)
Trial court could value husband's stock
in closely held corporations, in dividing
marital estate in divorce action, at amounts
to which husband and husband's expert
testified, but without providing discount
for lack of marketability of stock in closely
held corporations.
2. Divorce <8=>252.3(1, 5)
Marital assets consisting of stock in
closely held family corporation can be dis-

3. Mounteer summarily contends that his injuries are not compensable as resulting from an
"accident" under section 35-1-45 (1987) because
they did not arise from any "physical contact,
strain, exertion or other physical cause" but
from mental anguish and an exacerbated nervous condition resulting from Larsen's actions.
However, as the Utah Supreme Court held in
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 ?2d 15, 22
(Utah 1986), an "accident" for purposes of workers' compensation "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause
or the result of the injury." Whether Mounteer's injury arose from a physical or mental
cause is, therefore, irrelevant to the issue of
whether it occurred "by accident" within the
meaning of the statute.

4. Commenting on- Thompson v. Maimonides
Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 K.YS26 308
(1982), in which an employee's causes of action
imputing liability to the employer for a co-employee's defamation, negligence, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress were dismissed
for this same reason, Professor Larson notes:
This is true even if some of the harms resulting
are of a kind for which compensation affords
no remedy, such as loss of reputation, humiliation and embarrassment The psychological injuries such as depression or psychotic reactions
would, of course, still be compensable under the
compensation act." 2A A Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 68.23 n. 37 (1987).

